Chinese Youth and the West (Part Two)

Second part of a long interview with Mao Keji, one of the most interesting observers of China-India relations and Chinese society. We talk about West, AI, China and India

Last week, I released the first part of an extensive interview with Mao Keji, which you can find here:

This marks the second installment. (A quick note: I have published Mao's responses in full. While I don't necessarily concur with every statement, I believe his perspective is notably original, merits consideration, and, in several ways, cuts through a swathe of commonplaces surrounding China. On certain aspects, such as the 'socialist' characteristics of the People's Republic of China, I hope we will have further opportunity for dialogue.) Below is the second part, which I trust you will find as compelling as the first. (Thank you for the wealth of feedback, and my sincere thanks, once again, to Mao Keji.)

Interview with Mao Keji (second part)

Why Western media, in your opinion, often get their approach to China wrong?

Western media coverage of China often misses the mark, frequently falling into error due to entrenched habits of thinking. Foremost among these is a reliance on familiar ideological labels—socialism, communism, authoritarianism, totalitarianism, nationalism—that, when properly applied, can clarify complex realities efficiently. However, when misused, such labels obscure far more than they illuminate.

The most persistent flaw in Western media narratives is viewing China through a Soviet-era lens. Western perceptions remain profoundly shaped by memories of Soviet-style communism and authoritarianism, which are projected wholesale onto contemporary China. This cognitive shortcut is convenient yet dangerously misleading. For instance, unlike the Soviet Union, modern China boasts an immense, highly dynamic domestic market populated by globally competitive private enterprises.

When Western observers cling to outdated communist stereotypes, they inevitably overlook this crucial pillar of China's economic miracle. Conventional wisdom suggests that communist states long ago buried their capitalist classes—thus the mere existence of thriving private companies in China becomes inexplicable. Unable or unwilling to grasp China's genuine competitive dynamics, Western narratives often attribute corporate success instead to unfair state subsidies, market distortions, or morally dubious factors like low labor standards and intellectual-property theft. Such views reflect not insight but intellectual laziness and self-inflicted ignorance.

Equally striking is the Western fixation on the Chinese Communist Party and socialism—terms frequently invoked yet rarely understood beyond their negative connotations. Many in the West regard socialism as a failed experiment, exemplified by the Soviet collapse, leaving them unwilling or uninterested in exploring the nuances of China's contemporary socialist model. This dismissive stance ignores a fundamental reality: beyond China's fiercely competitive markets, the cornerstone of its extraordinary economic performance is precisely a robust socialist infrastructure that underpins essential public services.

Individually, China's inexpensive, quality-driven education, healthcare, public security, and infrastructure might seem insufficient to explain any single firm's global success. Yet collectively, they provide precisely the conditions necessary for broad-based prosperity. Consider China's annual graduation of over three million science and engineering students—a vast talent pool known as its "engineer dividend," critical for industrial innovation. Without sustained state investments in education, the market alone could never produce such abundant human capital. Thus, without this socialist backbone of basic public services, China's economic competitiveness would inevitably diminish.

China's reality is complex, blending ruthless market competition with extensive social support systems—nuances utterly lost when viewed through simplistic ideological lenses. Yet the real tragedy lies in Western media's unwillingness to delve deeper, perpetuating ignorance rather than genuine understanding.

Still, the West is not monolithic. Beneath the mainstream narratives, one finds divergent and often insightful perspectives. Businesspeople, for instance, tend to grasp China's complexities far better than politicians or academics, as ignorance in commerce invariably leads to losses. Young Westerners, too, demonstrate greater flexibility and realism compared to older generations, readily accepting China's rise as a new geopolitical reality and adjusting their perceptions accordingly. Thus, while mainstream Western media narratives remain deeply flawed, nuanced and informed perspectives on China do exist—if one knows where to look.

What do you think of all this hype surrounding AI?

For some time, I have closely observed developments in artificial intelligence (AI), convinced of its transformative potential for global industries. Yet, after sustained attention, I have grown somewhat skeptical about the West’s obsession with AI. Nearly every Western institution—corporations, media outlets, think tanks, universities, and governments—has enthusiastically jumped on the AI bandwagon. This intense fervor prompted me to question the rationale behind the recurring hype cycles: first cryptocurrencies, then the metaverse, now artificial intelligence. Why has the West increasingly fixated on abstract, software-driven innovations rather than concrete breakthroughs in hardware manufacturing? Is AI genuinely perceived as revolutionary, or is it merely the latest fashionable concept in a landscape otherwise lacking substantial innovation?

Exploring these questions, particularly through a comparison of China and the West, has led me to three insights.

First, there's the question of AI’s relative importance. In the West, AI has become an almost singular obsession, monopolizing public imagination and market speculation. In China, however, AI is just one promising sector among several. It shares attention with fields like robotics, space exploration, next-generation nuclear energy, and what Chinese innovators call the “low-altitude economy”—a futuristic vision where drone-based transportation fundamentally reshapes logistics, construction, and even real estate. Strikingly, this potentially transformative sector has barely made a ripple in Western conversations. Could it be that the West overlooks such innovations simply due to a lack of awareness, or does the gap reveal deeper structural inadequacies in Western industry itself? While AI’s significance is undeniable, its position as the definitive focus may need rethinking.

Second is the differing practical applications of AI. Western AI has predominantly taken the form of consumer-focused technologies, notably chatbots, which generate widespread public excitement and stock-market frenzies. Meanwhile, China has quietly deployed AI primarily in industrial applications—less visible but arguably more consequential. Consider e-commerce: Chinese retailers use AI to predict peak logistics demand, deploying resources in advance and significantly reducing congestion and delays. Similarly, Chinese energy firms apply AI to enhance drilling precision, improving success rates and reducing overall exploration costs. Ironically, these efficiency-enhancing applications receive far less publicity than chatbots, despite their tangible economic impact.

Third, and perhaps most important, is the broader societal implication of AI’s deployment. If AI truly succeeds in delivering dramatic improvements to efficiency, society must confront the critical challenge of how best to utilize the productivity gains it unleashes. For instance, if AI can significantly shorten compulsory schooling, how should societies redeploy this liberated human capital most effectively? As AI becomes universal, countries will compete less on technological sophistication alone and more on their ability to adapt policies and restructure societies to fully leverage AI-driven growth. Put differently, today’s AI frenzy may represent only the initial phase of a broader societal transformation. The true beneficiaries in the AI era may not be those nations with the most advanced technologies, but rather those most adept at integrating AI with social reform.

Regarding India-China relations, with Trump in office, what future could there be?

How will India-China relations evolve during Trump’s tenure? Like everything else related to Trump, this question defies easy answers, given the administration’s inherent unpredictability. While it’s challenging to provide definitive conclusions, we can nonetheless identify several likely trends.

Firstly, strategic coordination between the U.S. and India on China-related issues would likely deteriorate under Trump. Unlike the Biden administration, Trump openly dismisses alliances, particularly within multilateral frameworks. He much prefers bilateral negotiations, applying direct, one-on-one pressure rather than leveraging broader alliances. Consequently, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (U.S., Japan, India, Australia) became largely inactive during his previous term. Despite India’s significant potential as a counterweight to China within America's Indo-Pacific strategy, Trump showed little strategic regard for this role. Instead, his administration consistently prioritized immediate economic benefits, demanding increased Indian orders for U.S. arms and energy as a form of tribute to serve his domestic political agenda. Modi’s government viewed such demands with suspicion, seeing them essentially as protection money. As a result, India’s trust in America's strategic reliability under Trump weakened significantly, making Modi’s government far more cautious in its dealings with China—particularly as the U.S.-India relationship became increasingly transactional.

Secondly, Trump’s intensified pressure on China might tempt Modi’s government into more opportunistic, and potentially aggressive, posturing. Trump recently introduced "reciprocal tariffs," targeting Chinese exports. India currently enjoys significantly lower tariffs on exports to the U.S. compared to key competitors such as China, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. In this context, Modi’s government appears eager to leverage these U.S.-China tensions, aligning more openly with Washington’s anti-China stance to attract American investment and secure favorable trade terms. If Trump continues to escalate his economic confrontations with China, creating further instability in Sino-American relations, Modi’s administration would likely become more opportunistic and assertive toward Beijing, undermining recent positive developments in India-China ties.

Finally, the influence of pro-Indian voices within the Trump administration adds another layer of complexity. Trump’s inner circle prominently features individuals of Indian descent or sympathetic to Indian interests. For instance, Tulsi Gabbard, a prominent Hindu politician, now serves as Director of National Intelligence, while Kash Patel, an Indian-American, leads the FBI. Moreover, Vice President J.D. Vance’s wife is Indian-American, and Mike Waltz, previously head of the Congressional India Caucus, currently serves as National Security Advisor. At the same time, Hindu nationalist groups in the U.S. have increasingly aligned themselves with Trump’s MAGA base, united by shared anti-Muslim sentiments. Given Trump’s personalistic style of diplomacy, these connections have led to intensified informal communications and deeper, irregular diplomatic interactions between the U.S. and India, thereby introducing additional uncertainties into the India-China relationship.

In short, India-China relations under Trump’s second term would likely become even more unpredictable and subject to opportunistic maneuvering, shaped profoundly by Trump's transactional diplomacy, India’s cautious pragmatism, and the considerable influence of pro-Indian factions within the administration.

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Thank you for reading the newsletter. I'm a podcaster working with Chora Media, where I host two podcasts, 'Altri Orienti' and 'Fuori da Qui'. I lived in China and Asia for a long time and am currently in Beijing for a few months. I try to share what's happening in these places through the newsletter, books, and videos on YouTube. And also here on Instagram.

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